Peace Index - March 2026

The current survey was conducted during Operation “Roaring Lion” against Iran, alongside an evolving front with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, while the ceasefire in Gaza has remained in place. In this survey, we focused on assessing Israeli public attitudes toward President Trump’s plan for ending the war in Gaza, toward settler violence against Palestinians, and toward possible steps vis-à-vis Lebanon, in addition to the recurring questions regarding support for negotiations and future solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Support for Negotiations and Solutions to the Conflict with the Palestinians

  • The level of support for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority among the Jewish public remains low, standing at only 26% in the current survey, a slight decline from 30% in the previous survey conducted in November 2025. Despite a modest recovery in mid-2024, over the past year this rate has returned to its post-October 7 low. A decline is also evident among the Arab public, from 78% in the previous survey to 67% in the current one. However, the level of support remains substantially higher than among Jewish respondents. In other words, even after the end of the fighting in Gaza and the return of most hostages, there is no sign of renewed support for negotiations; rather, the data point to further erosion.
  • The opposition to negotiations among Jewish respondents stems primarily from the political right and from coalition voters: only 5% of opinion-holders who self-identify as right-wing and 17% of those identifying as moderate right support negotiations, compared to 56% among centrists and 84% among left-wing respondents. The voting breakdown reveals this same pattern: only 8% of opinion-holding coalition voters support negotiations, compared to 54% of opposition voters.
  • The rate of belief that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will lead to peace in the coming years remains very low. Among Jewish respondents, it stands at only 13%, almost unchanged from the previous survey, whereas among Arab respondents it stands at 47%, a slight decline compared to November 2025.
  • As in the previous survey from November 2025, none of the four long-term solutions presented receives majority support among Jewish respondents in the current survey. Of the options, annexation of the territories and the establishment of one state under Israeli rule with limited rights for Palestinians remains the most popular among Jews, with 38% support, followed by continuation of the status quo with 31% support. Support for the two-state solution rises slightly to 23%, compared to 20% in the previous survey, but remains very low relative to its pre-October 7 level. The option of a binational state with full and equal rights remains the least supported among Jewish respondents, with only 8% in favor.
  • Among Arab respondents, the two-state solution remains the strongly preferred option, with 71% support, similar to 74% in the previous survey. Support for a binational state declines somewhat, from 59% in the previous survey to 51% in the current one. At the same time, support for annexation and for maintaining the status quo remains very low, at 12% in each case. Thus, even where there is some erosion in support for more conciliatory solutions, Arab respondents continue to clearly prefer solutions based on equality or partition, rather than continuation of the status quo or annexation.
  • Among opinion-holders in the Jewish public, the divisions between political camps regarding future solutions are particularly pronounced. Support for the two-state solution stands at only 3% on the right, 14% among the moderate right, 44% in the center, and 86% on the left. By contrast, support for annexation stands at 64% on the right and 49% among the moderate right, but drops to 23% in the center and only 3% on the left. The voting breakdown tells a similarly clear story: only 8% of coalition voters support the two-state solution, compared to 49% of opposition voters; conversely, 52% of coalition voters support annexation, compared to only 21% of opposition voters.
  • When turning to the perceived feasibility of the various solutions, the option regarded as most likely is continuation of the status quo, even though it is not widely supported in principle. Among Jewish respondents, 48% believe that the most likely outcome in the foreseeable future is continuation of the current situation, whereas only 23% believe annexation is the most likely scenario. Among Arab respondents, by contrast, 44% see the two-state solution as the option most likely to materialize, while only 26% believe the status quo will continue.
  • Alongside the deep dispute over the preferred way to end the conflict, broad agreement persists that continuation of the conflict harms Israel. Seventy-eight percent of Jews and 74% of Arabs believe that continuation of the conflict is harmful or very harmful to Israel. This finding cuts across political camps: among opinion-holders, 72% of those identifying as right-wing and 77% of those identifying as moderate right also believe that continuing the conflict harms Israel. Thus, even where there is no consensus on the preferred solution, there remains broad agreement on the costs imposed by continuation of the current situation.

Press Release (PDF)

Findings (PDF)

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