The Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, September 2024
- An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (81%) think the Palestinian suffering under the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip justifies what Hamas did on October 7; only 28% of Israeli Arabs take this view. Among Israeli Jews, 84% believe Hamas’ attack on October 7 justifies current Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip.
- We asked how Israelis interpreted Palestinian aims on October 7 and in the ensuing war. The vast majority of Israeli Jews (93%) attribute maximalist and genocidal aspirations to the Palestinians’ aim: 66% select “to commit genocide against us,” and 27% believe the aim is to conquer land and expel the Jews. When Palestinians were asked how they interpret Israel’s aim in the current war, again, a vast majority of Palestinians (88%) attribute maximalist and genocidal aspirations to Israel: 61% select “commit genocide against us,” and 27% select “to conquer our land and expel the people.”
- Large majorities on both sides, 72% among Israeli Jews, 68% among Palestinians, and 60% among Israeli Arabs expect escalation in the West Bank. Similarly, 58% of the Israelis (62% of Israeli Jews and 41% of Israeli Arabs) and 53% of the Palestinians believe the Gaza war will expand into a regional war.
- A slim majority of 51% of the Palestinians, 54% of Israeli Jews, and 17% of Israeli Arabs are opposed to the vision presented by the US for the future after the end of the war in Gaza. The vision was described as having four components: ceasefire/exchange of hostages/prisoners, revitalized PA to take control of the Gaza Strip, two-state solution, and regional peace and Saudi-Israeli normalization. Support for the vision stands at 83% among Israeli Arabs, 46% among Israeli Jews, and 45% among the Palestinians.
- Support for the two-state solution drops significantly among Israeli Jews and rises moderately among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Today, 21% of Israeli Jews, compared to 34% in December 2022 and 42% in September 2020; 40% of Palestinians, compared to 33% in 2022 and 43% in 2020; and 72% of Israeli Arabs, compared to 60% in 2022 and 59% in 2020, support the concept of the two-state solution. Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 31% in total support the two-state solution. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among Israeli Jews, and all Israelis, since the beginning of the Pulse, in June 2016 and throughout earlier years of joint polling going back to 2010. A quarter of the Palestinians, 14% of Israeli Jews, 49% of Israeli Arabs, and 21% of all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, support a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians. Support among Israeli Jews for “annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians,” stands today at 42% , the highest ever recorded in the Pulse. Among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, support for a one-state solution without equal rights for Israeli Jews stands at 33% and 17% respectively. It is worth noting that 44% of all Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews do not support the two-state solution or any of its two alternatives.
- Support for the alternative of a two-state confederation among Palestinians stands today at 35%, compared to 22% two years ago. The current rise in support comes mostly from the Gaza Strip. Support for the confederation among Israelis stands at 20%, 12% among Israeli Jews and 52% among Israeli Arabs. In 2022, support for the confederation idea among all Israelis stood at 28%.
- Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in 2018, 2020 and 2022 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times between 2016 and 2018. Findings show an 8-point rise in Palestinian support, a 6-point drop in Israeli Jewish support, and a 7-point rise in support of Israeli Arabs. Today, 34% of Palestinians, 25% of Israeli Jews, and 69% of Israeli Arabs support the package. The highest support among the Palestinians, at 43%, was recorded in the Pulse in June 2017; among Israeli Jews, at 45%, in June 2018; and among Israeli Arabs, at 91%, in June 2018. The peace package comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Sixty-three of Palestinians and 55% of Israelis (65% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs) are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package. By contrast to Pulse findings in recent years, more Israeli Jews support the detailed package than those who support the two-state solution as a general, by four points.
- For the fifth time, we have conducted an experiment to test one-sided incentives intended to raise support for the two-state solution; these were tested among half of each sample. Among four out of the six unilateral incentives offered to the Palestinians can each produce a majority support among them, increasing it up to 55%. The results among Israeli Jews were even better, showing all six one-sided incentives offered to Israeli Jews leading to a majority support for the peace package, increasing it up to 60%.
- For the fourth time, we tested paired incentives, in which each side receives an incentive and must accept an incentive their side provides to the other – this was tested among the other half of each sample. These were less effective, but the findings were also promising. Five out of the six pairs increased Israeli Jewish support and one (fighting incitement in textbooks on both sides) produced a majority Jewish support for the package, increasing it from 25% to 61%. The results on the Palestinian side were almost as successful: four pairs increased support and one increased it from 34% to 54% (allowing Palestinian laborers into Israel).
- The survey examined support for four bi-lateral potential confidence building measures. Two gained a majority support among the Palestinians while none of them received majority support among Israeli Jews. The highest support Palestinians and Israelis gave, 87% and 48% respectively, was to one that called for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the release of the Israeli hostages, and the Palestinian prisoners.
- Levels of trust in the other side are very low and declining among the Palestinians, 94% compared to 86% in 2022 believe Israeli Jews are not trustworthy; among Israeli Jews, 86%, compared to 85% in 2022, believe the same about the Palestinians. By contrast, a majority of Israeli Arabs (64%) believes that Israeli Jews can be trusted.
- Similarly, while the average score of humanity each side gives to itself is very high, 88 out of 100 among the Palestinians and 87/100 among Israeli Jews, the average score of humanity each side gives to the other side is very low, 6 out of 100 among the Palestinians and 14/100 among Israeli Jews. The gap between the two scores narrows considerably among Israeli Arabs: the average score they give the Palestinians is 64 and to Israeli Jews 54.
- As we found in the previous survey, each side perceives that its victimization is the worst compared to other peoples who have suffered from persecution and injustice (84% of Israeli Jews, 83% of Palestinians, and 62% of Israeli Arabs agree with this statement).
- A vast majority among both groups, 89% among Palestinians and 87% among Israeli Jews, see themselves as rightful owners of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river.
