



**The International MA Program in
Conflict Resolution and Mediation**
The Gershon H. Gordon
Faculty of Social Sciences
Tel Aviv University




Peace Index – July 2026

Dr. Nimrod Rosler and Dr. Alon Yakter


The current survey was conducted against the backdrop of public debates over the implementation of the agreements ending the fighting in Gaza and in Lebanon. In Gaza, the debate concerned the order of implementation of Trump's plan for ending the war. In particular, the recent proposal suggests to first transfer authority to the temporary Palestinian government of experts and bring in the international stabilization force, and only afterwards act to disarm Hamas. In Lebanon, discussions, alongside tensions, continue over the implementation of the framework agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon. In this survey, we examined public attitudes toward both agreements, as well as toward the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, in addition to the recurring questions regarding support for negotiations and future solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Support for Negotiations and Solutions to the Conflict with the Palestinians


- **The level of support for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority among the Jewish public remains low, standing at 29%**, a slight increase compared to 26% in the previous survey conducted in March 2026, but still within the low range measured since October 7, 2023. Among the Arab public, by contrast, support reverts to the high average of recent years following a momentary decline in March 2026 (81% in the current survey compared to 67% in March).
- **The opposition to negotiations among Jewish respondents continues to concentrate on the right and among coalition voters.** Among opinion-holders, only 7% of those who self-identify as right-wing and 22% of those identifying as moderate right support negotiations, compared to 54% of centrists and 83% of left-wing respondents. The voting breakdown paints this same picture: only 7% of opinion-holding coalition voters support negotiations, compared to 63% of opposition voters.
- **The rate of belief that negotiations will lead to peace in the coming years remains very low.** Among Jewish respondents it stands at only 12% (13% in March 2026), whereas among Arab respondents it stands at 48% (47% in March). In other words, even when support for negotiations rises, the increase is not accompanied by an expectation that they will in fact lead to an agreement.




- **None of the four solutions presented receives majority support among the Jewish public, with some erosion in support for the two leading options.** Annexation of the territories with limited rights to Palestinians remains the most popular option among Jews, but support for it declines from 38% to 33%; support for continuation of the status quo declines from 31% to 25%; support for the two-state solution remains stable (24% compared to 23% in the previous survey); and the option of a binational state remains the least supported, with only 6%. The result is a broader dispersion of positions, with no leading alternative.
- **Among Arab respondents, the two-state solution remains the clearly preferred option, with 71% support,** unchanged from the previous survey. By contrast, support for a binational state declines sharply, from 51% to 39%. Support for annexation (7%) and for continuation of the status quo (12%) remains very low. Thus, even given erosion in support for a solution based on equality within a single framework, Arab respondents continue to clearly prefer a solution based on partition.
- **Among opinion-holders in the Jewish public, the partisan divisions remain particularly pronounced.** Support for the two-state solution stands at 6% on the right, 16% among the moderate right, 39% in the center, and 80% on the left. By contrast, support for annexation stands at 53% on the right and 42% among the moderate right, but drops to 25% in the center and only 8% on the left. The voting breakdown tells a similarly clear story: 8% of coalition voters support the two-state solution, compared to 51% of opposition voters; conversely, 57% of coalition voters support annexation, compared to only 19% of opposition voters.




Rate of support for various solutions to the conflict



- **When turning to the question of actual feasibility, continuation of the status quo is still perceived as the most likely scenario.** Among Jewish respondents, 47% believe that the most likely outcome in the foreseeable future is continuation of the current situation, whereas only 21% think so regarding annexation and 13% regarding two states. Among Arab respondents the picture is different: 31% see the two-state solution as the option most likely to materialize, while 28% believe the status quo will continue.
- **When nonetheless asked to choose one eventual solution they are willing to accept, a deep gap between the two publics is revealed.** Among Jews, 42% choose annexation, 26% the two-state solution, and 5% a binational state, while 27% do not know. Among Arabs, 64% choose the two-state solution, 20% a binational state, and only 3% annexation. The high rate of “don’t know” responses among the Jewish public indicates that even when a decision is required, a substantial share of the public does not identify with any of the options on the table.




The solution respondents are willing to accept if they must choose one




- **Alongside the sharp dispute over the desirable path, and the assumption that the status quo will persist, the agreement that continuation of the conflict harms Israel is also strengthening.** The survey shows that 83% of Jews and 80% of Arabs believe that continuation of the conflict is harmful or very harmful to Israel, compared to 78% and 74% respectively in March 2026. This finding cuts across political camps: among opinion-holders, 76% of those identifying as right-wing and 88% of those identifying as moderate right also share this view.

Expansion of Settlements in the West Bank

- **A majority of the Jewish public supports expanding the settlements, and slightly more so on security grounds than on grounds of historical right.** The data show that 63% of Jews support expansion based on the Jewish people's right to the land, and 66% based on security needs. Among the Arab public, support for both rationales stands at only 10%.
- **The gap between the two rationales widens the further leftward one moves on the political map.** Among opinion-holders, on the right and among the moderate right the two rationales are almost identical (94% on the right; 83% versus 86% among the moderate right), but in the center the gap is 47% versus 51%, and on the left 14% versus 25%. It is the security rationale that succeeds in mobilizing a degree of support beyond the right-wing bloc. In the voting breakdown: 94% of Jewish coalition voters support expansion on grounds of right, compared to 38% of opposition voters; for the security rationale the figures are 92% versus 46%.




Support for expanding settlements in the West Bank (Jews, opinion-holders)




Support for Trump's Plan and the Order of Its Implementation

- **Support for Trump's plan in Gaza continues to erode compared to previous surveys.** In the full sample, 48% support the plan (57% of opinion-holders). Among Jewish respondents, support stands at 47% (55% of opinion-holders), compared to 55% in March 2026 and 61% in November 2025. Among Arab respondents it stands at 54%, compared to 50% in March and 72% in November 2025. The plan still commands substantial support, but it is far from consensual.
- **Here, too, the internal divisions within the Jewish public are highly pronounced.** Among opinion-holders, support for the plan stands at only 25% among those identifying as right-wing, compared to 54% among the moderate right, 76% in the center, and 85% on the left. The voting breakdown reveals a similar gap: 37% of coalition voters support the plan, compared to 78% of opposition voters.
- **When moving from the plan itself to the order of its implementation, the picture is reversed.** We examined the proposal raised by figures in Trump's Board of Peace, according to which authority would now be transferred to the temporary Palestinian government of experts and the international stabilization force would enter, and only after this stage would action be taken to disarm Hamas. **Only 27% of Jews support this (33% of opinion-holders), compared to 57% who oppose it.** Among the Arab public the picture is reversed: 58% are in favor (80% of opinion-holders).
- **The opposition to changing the order of implementation cuts across camps, uncharacteristically of the survey's other questions.** Among opinion-holders in the Jewish public, support stands at 21% on the right, 32% among the moderate right, and 41% in the center—and even on the left it does not cross the 50% threshold (46%). The gap between coalition voters and opposition voters, which amounts to tens of points on most of the survey's questions, narrows here to 24% versus 42%.




- **It appears, therefore, that the Jewish public is more open to the general principle of the plan than to its practical order of operations.** While support for the plan as a whole is divided along political camps, the demand that the disarmament of Hamas not be deferred beyond the transfer of control in Gaza is shared by almost all segments of the Jewish public. This demand, rather than opposition to the plan as such, constitutes the clearest public red line emerging from the survey with respect to the Gaza front.

Trump's plan: support for the plan versus support for changing the order of implementation (opinion-holders)




The Impact of Trump's Plan on Public Attitudes Toward Negotiations

- **In this survey, too, presenting a scenario in which Trump's plan will be fully implemented substantially raises support for negotiations among the Jewish public.** Aggregate support rises from 29% to 43% of the full Jewish sample (from 32% to 47% among opinion-holders)—an increase of about 15 points, similar to that measured in November 2025. At the individual level, 77 Jewish respondents moved from opposition to support under this scenario, compared to only four who moved in the opposite direction.
- **The increase is evident across all camps, but it does not change the order of magnitude on the right.** Among opinion-holders, support rises from 7% to 15% on the right, from 22% to 38% among the moderate right, from 54% to 75% in the center, and from 83% to 94% on the left. In the voting breakdown: 19% of coalition voters compared to 80% of opposition voters.
- **Belief that negotiations will lead to peace also rises under this scenario but remains low.** Among Jewish respondents it rises from 12% to 18% (from 12% to 20% among opinion-holders). In other words, the scenario changes the willingness to enter the process more than it changes the expectation that the process will succeed.
- **Among Arab respondents the effect runs in a different direction.** Support for negotiations actually declines from 81% to 73% under the assumption that the plan will be implemented,




while the level of belief that negotiations will lead to peace remains unchanged (48%). This may reflect reservations about particular components of the plan itself, rather than about the idea of negotiations as such.

The impact of Trump's plan on attitudes (opinion-holders)




Lebanon: The Framework Agreement Versus a Security Foothold

- **A majority in both publics supports the framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon, in which the two states declare their aspiration to put an end to the conflict between them, to ensure their sovereignty and security, and to establish neighborly relations of peace.** Fifty-seven percent of the full sample support the transfer of full security responsibility to the Lebanese army in pilot areas in which Hezbollah's infrastructure would be dismantled (65% of opinion-holders in the Jewish public and 76% in the Arab public), and 55% support a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon following the dismantling of the infrastructure and the establishment of peace between the states (60% and 79% of opinion-holders respectively).
- **At the same time, a majority of the Jewish public wishes to retain a security foothold in Lebanon.** Fifty-two percent of Jews (61% of opinion-holders) support Israel maintaining a permanent security zone in southern Lebanon, even if doing so would prevent the achievement of an agreement with Lebanon, compared to only 24% among the Arab public.
- **The picture does not amount to a choice between the two.** Nineteen percent of Jewish respondents simultaneously support both a full withdrawal with the establishment of peace and a permanent security zone—about a third of all supporters of withdrawal. Here, too, as with respect to the Palestinian arena, segments of the public do not perceive the diplomatic track and a security foothold as mutually exclusive alternatives.
- **The political breakdown places the two dimensions in opposite directions.** Among opinion-holders, support for transferring responsibility to the Lebanese army rises from 40% on the right



to 89% on the left, and support for a full withdrawal from 35% to 89%. By contrast, support for a permanent security zone declines from 85% on the right to only 20% on the left. In the voting breakdown: 53% and 45% of coalition voters support the two steps of the agreement, compared to 83% and 80% of opposition voters; whereas 80% of coalition voters support the security zone, compared to 39% of opposition voters.

Lebanon: the framework agreement versus a security foothold



The Negotiation Index:

Jewish sample: 24.8 (an increase of 0.3 points compared to the previous index)

General sample: 32.0 (an increase of 1.9 points compared to the previous index—see correction note)

Under the assumption that Trump's plan will be fully implemented, the index stands at 34.6 in the Jewish sample and at 39.7 in the general sample.

The negotiation index is calculated by weighing two questions: the degree of support for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and the degree of belief that negotiations with the PA will lead to peace in the coming years.

Correction note: an error occurred in the calculation of the general negotiation index in March 2026. The corrected general index for March 2026 is 30.1.

The Peace Index is conducted by Dr. Nimrod Rosler from the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation and Dr. Alon Yakter from the School of Political Science, Government, and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University. The survey was conducted in Hebrew and Arabic online by the iPanel company on July 26–30, 2026, among 608 respondents, including 504 Jews and 104 Arabs, who are a representative national sample of the entire adult population (ages 18 and over) in Israel. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is $\pm 4.2\%$ at a confidence level of 95%.

Visit the Peace Index website for the full results:
<https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex>