#### Peace Index- January 2024


Dr. Nimrod Rosler and Dr. Alon Yakter

#### We are happy to announce the launch of a new website for the Peace Index:

https://en-social-sciences.tau.ac.il/peaceindex

#### The War in Gaza: Aims and War Management


• Similar to the results of the Peace Index survey from November 2023, even three months after the start of the war, the majority (53%) of respondents still think that the government has no clear goals in the war. The criticism of this lack of clarity expresses a deep divide between the voters of the opposition parties and of the coalition, with a large majority of opinion holders from among the former (69%) believing that the government does not have clear goals compared to a minority (38%) from among the latter. The main change from November 2023 is a greater consolidation of coalition voters in favor of the government's conduct, while opposition voters remain equally critical.




• When examining the public's attitudes regarding the extent of the IDF's use of force in Gaza and its results, the attitudes of the Jewish public are clearly different from those of the Arab public. A large majority of the Jewish public thinks that the IDF uses adequate or too little force in Gaza. Unlike the beginning of the war, now about half of the Jewish public (51% compared to 37% in November) believes that the IDF uses firepower appropriately against Gaza, compared to 43% (58% in November) who believe that there is use of too little firepower. An absolute majority (88%) also justifies the scope of casualties on the Palestinian side when considering the goals of the war. On the other hand, over half of the Arab public (55%) believes that the IDF uses too much firepower against Gaza compared




to a fifth (20%) who agree that the scope of firepower use is appropriate. Further, about half of the Arab respondents (53%) believe that the extent of casualties on the Palestinian side is not justified. At the same time, alongside these deep disagreements, over half of both groups (59% among the Jews and 54% among the Arabs) think that the extent of casualties on the Jewish side is unjustified. A significant minority among the Arab public refrains from expressing an opinion regarding the extent of casualties on the Palestinian side (34%) and on the Israeli side (29%).





• A significant change compared to the previous survey is evident with the desired priorities for the government in the dilemma between the elimination of Hamas and the release of the hostages in any possible way. Currently, the Jewish public is divided between the first

option (50%) and the second (48%). Here, too, a widening partisan split can be observed between the voters of the coalition parties, whose majority still favor the elimination of Hamas (64%), compared to voters of the opposition parties, a clear majority of whom (72%) favor the release of the hostages. The change in priorities is also reflected among the Arab public: currently, two-thirds (66%) support the release of the hostages and only a small minority (11%) support the elimination of Hamas.<sup>1</sup>




#### The War in Gaza: The Day After

We examined several questions regarding the day after the war ends, which demonstrate that
there is deep disagreement on this issue between coalition and opposition voters and
between Jews and Arabs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It is possible that the differences between the current survey and the previous survey among Arab respondents are due to a change in the wording of the question's Arabic translation. While in the previous survey the question could be interpreted as examining the government's position, now it was emphasized that it refers to the participant's position concerning these goals.




• First, when the respondents were asked about the possibility of successfully achieving a long-term calm in Gaza after the war, the Jewish public was divided between those who believe that the chances are high (48%) and those who believe that the chances are low (42%). The political-partisan and sectoral-national fault lines are evident in the distribution of answers, where an identical percentage (61%) among the opinion holders of the opposition voters believe that the chances are low compared to coalition voters who believe that the chances are high. In contrast, only a fifth (20%) of the Arab public believes that there are good chances that the war will successfully lead to a long-term calm, while about half (52%) believe that the chances are low and over a quarter (28%) do not express a position on the issue.




• Another question we examined relates to the desired arrangement in the Gaza Strip after the end of the war from a security standpoint and from a political-civilian standpoint. Among the Jewish public, the answers are clearly divided according to the ideological continuum between right and left. While a majority supports Israeli security control among the opinion holders self-identifying with the right (90%), the moderate right (73%), and the center (59%), a majority of self-identified leftists (60%) prefers security control by international and regional forces. A negligible minority among the general Jewish public (2%) prefers security control by the Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, a majority supports political-civilian control by international and regional forces in Gaza among the opinion-holders on the left (54%), the center (67%), and the moderate right (62%), whereas about two-thirds of the right-wing respondents (65%) prefer Israeli control.





- Among the general Arab public, a small minority (8%) supports Israeli security control in Gaza, and the rest are divided between preference for control by international and regional forces (38%), by the Palestinian Authority (23%), and those who do not express a position (31%). Similarly, the opinions regarding political-civilian control are almost equally divided between those who prefer international and regional forces (32%), those who prefer the Palestinian Authority (32%), and those who do not express a position (31%).
- Finally, we examined whether messages from ministers and the coalition members of the Knesset promoting the re-establishment of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip gained traction with the public. The findings indicate that about half of the Jewish public (52%) supports the establishment of Jewish civilian settlements in the Gaza Strip after the end of the war, with the majority of support coming from opinion-holders among the voters of the coalition parties (79%) compared to broad opposition among opposition voters (74%). Over two-thirds of the Arab public (69%) express opposition to the idea, and about a fifth do not express a position (21%).






#### **Attitudes Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

- After the previous survey detected an unprecedented drop in the rate of support of Jewish respondents for solutions based on agreement with the other side, the trend is maintained in the current survey as well. Only 27% support conducting peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and the belief that such a process will lead to peace in the coming years remains almost the same (9%).
- The rates of support for negotiations remain high among Arab respondents (75%), and the belief that such a process will lead to peace also remains the opinion of over half (52%).





- When considering the support for different solutions to the conflict among the Jewish respondents, the support for the two-state solution remains low and almost the same as in the previous survey (27%), while the support for annexing the territories and granting limited rights to the Palestinians living in them increases slightly (38%) and remains the preferred option. Along with the lack of support for the solution of one democratic state (6%), the broad opposition to the continued existence of the status quo is maintained (72%).
- Among the Arab public there remains broad support for the two-state solution (67%), despite a slight decrease compared to the previous survey. Support for a binational state is also eroding and the number of supporters is now the same as the number of opponents (37%). Along with this, there is also a trend of decreasing opposition to annexation (62%) and the continuation of the existing situation (67%).




### The International MA Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation


The Gershon H. Gordon Faculty of Social Sciences Tel Aviv University

#### Rate of Positive Support for Various Solutions to the Conflict


## The Establishment of an Independent Palestinian State Alongside the State of Israel




## The Annexation of the Territories and Establishment of One State Under Israeli Rule with Limited Palestinian Rights



# The Establishment of a Binational State Between the River and the Sea with Equal Rights for Jews and Palestinians



### Continuing the Current Situation





#### **The Negotiation Index:**

Jewish sample: 24.3 (an increase of 2.7 points compared to the previous index)

General sample: 31 (an increase of 1.6 points compared to the previous index)

The negotiation index is calculated by weighing two questions: the degree of support for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and the degree of belief that negotiations with the PA will lead to peace in the coming years.

The Peace Index is conducted by Dr. Nimrod Rosler from the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation and Dr. Alon Yakter from the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University. The survey was conducted online by the iPanel company on January 8-15, 2024, among 605 interviewees, who are a representative national sample of the entire adult population (ages 18 and over) in Israel. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample -  $\pm 4.2\%$  at a confidence level of 95%.